Physics and Five Problems in the Philosophy of Mind by Kauffman, Stuart
ar
X
iv
:0
90
7.
24
94
v1
  [
ph
ys
ics
.hi
st-
ph
]  
15
 Ju
l 2
00
9 Physics and Five Problems in the
Philosophy of Mind
Stuart Kauffman
July 12, 2009
Departments of Biosciences and Physics and Astronomy
The University of Calgary
Signal Processing, Tampere University of Technology
External Professor, The Santa Fe Institute
Abstract
Since Descartes’ dualism, with his res extensa and res cogitans, six
fundamental problems in the philosophy and natural history of mind are
these: 1. how does mind act on matter? 2. If mind does not act on matter
is mind a mere epiphenomenon? 3. What might be the source of free will?
4. What might be the source of a responsible free will? 5. Why might it
have been selectively advantageous to evolve consciousness? 6. What ”is”
consciousness? Many outstanding neuroscientists and philosophers hold
to a computational view of mind, driven by the power of computers. Pen-
rose advanced the hypothesis that mind might be quantum coherent and
be acted upon by quantum gravity. I agree with Penrose that mind and
brain are underwritten by the specific physics of the mind-brain system.
I approach the first five of the above six problems based on two physi-
cal postulates. First the mind-brain system is a quantum coherent, but
reversibly decohering and recohering system. This allows me to answer
1) above, mind does not act causally on brain at all, rather it acausally
decohers to classicity (for all practical purposes), hence has consequences
for brain and body as matter. Epiphenomenalism is averted. A quantum
mind, because it is acausal on Copenhagen including Born, yields a free
will, but a merely random free will, not a responsible free will. Second, the
most radical part of this article proposes that the quantum classical inter-
face is not always describable by a law: specifically in a special relativity
setting, no function, F, maps the present state of the system mind-brain
into its future. In its place is a nonrandom yet lawless process. I seek in
this non-random yet lawless process a source for a responsible free will.
Finally, if the quantum-classical boundary can be non-random yet lawless,
then no algorithmic simulation of the world or ourselves can calculate the
real world, hence the evolutionary selective advantages for evolving con-
sciousness to ”know” it may be great. I make no progress on problem 6,
the hard problem of qualia.
1
Introduction
Based on two physical postulates, I approach and hope to resolve five funda-
mental problems in the philosophy of mind that have plagued us for hundreds
of years. Both postulates are testable in principle. If mind depends upon the
specific physics of the mind-brains system, mind is, in part, a matter for physi-
cists.
Since Descartes invested the Western mind with res cogitans and res extensa,
the seemingly insurmountable philosophic and scientific questions his dualism
posed have stalked us. Indeed, a friendly observer of the past 350 years of
the philosophy of mind might be forgiven for saying that res cogitans and res
extensa, despite all our efforts with Dualism, Materialism, Idealism, and now
the Mind Brain Identity Theory, have held us at bay. I say ’at bay’ because it
is clear that there is no agreement that we have solved the mighty problems of
consciousness and mind, (1,2,3,4).
In the present essay I propose to broach new ground that I hope may help
solve five fundamental problems in the philosophy of mind and the evolution of
consciousness: 1) How does mind act on matter? 2) If it cannot, is mind a mere
epiphenomenon? 3) Whence free will in the face of causal closure in the brain?
More, I hope to make inroads on a fundamental fourth problem, 4) Whence a
responsible free will. But there is a further issue I want to discuss: 5) What is
the evolutionary usefulness, or selective advantage, of consciousness? And 6) is
there any hope that my tries at 1-5 might shed light on the ’hard problem’ of
consciousness experiences, of qualia? The answer to this last question appears,
as yet, ’No’.
All the above questions are deeply familiar, and the subjects of massive ef-
forts by philosophers, (1,2,3), neuroscientists, (5,6), physicists, (7) and others.
I propose to state each of these problems, then tackle them with two physi-
cal hypotheses: First, the mind is a quantum coherent-reversibly decohering-
recohering system in the brain. Thus, following R. Penrose, (8) I believe that
consciousness is a problem, at least in part, of the physical basis subtending
it. While the arguments I advance differ sharply from those of Penrose, and
while he was strongly attacked for suggesting a quantum-consciousness connec-
tion, he was courageous, and did much to legitimize the ’C’ word in serious
scientific discussion. In this view I sharply differ from those who hope for an
emergence of consciousness in a computational mind, (3), whether comprised of
chips, neurons, or water buckets.
The second physical hypothesis is scientifically and philosophically radical.
The famous Turing-Church-Deutsch, TCD, principle, (9), states that any phys-
ical machine can be simulated to arbitrary accuracy on a universal Turing ma-
chine. This thesis is profoundly related to reductionism and the long held belief,
since Descartes, Newton, Einstein, Schrodinger, and Weinberg, (10), that there
is a ’Final Theory of Everything’ at the base of physics, which explains all that
unfolds in the universe by logical entailment. As we shall see, this view de-
rives from Aristotle’s analysis of scientific explanation as deduction: All men
are mortal, Socrates is a man, thus, Socrates is a mortal. As Robert Rosen
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rightly points out, (11), with Newton, we have eliminated all but one of Aris-
totle’s four causes, formal, final, material and efficient, retaining only efficient
cause in science and mathematized it as deduction. Thus, Newton’s equations,
in differential form, with initial and boundary conditions are ’solved’ for the be-
havior of the system by integration, which is precisely deduction. This identity
of efficient cause with deduction leads directly to the reductionist view held by
Weinberg and others. There can be no unentailed events, so emergence is just
wrong and there must be a final theory ’down there’ from which all derives by
entailment. As Weinberg famously says, (10), the explanatory arrows all point
downward, from societies to people to organs to cells to biochemistry to chem-
istry to physics and ultimately to particle physics and General Relativity, or
perhaps String Theory, (12). Turing-Church-Deutsch holds precisely the same
view - it is algorithms all the way down so entailment all the way up. In this
view, the universe is a formalizable machine, and we who live in it are TCD ma-
chines. Then we, robot-like can use the inputs from our sensors and calculate
all we need to flourish, machines afloat in a machine universe. But then, un-
fortunately, there is no selective advantage to conscious experience. Why then,
did it evolve?
I will present four lines of reasoning and candidate evidence suggesting that
reductionism is very powerful, but powerfully inadequate. I will thus argue
that there can be no ’theory of everything’ that can explain all that unfolds
in the universe by logical entailment, hence that the universe and biosphere
in their evolution are not machines, and that the Turing-Church-Deutsch does
not hold, (4,13). In such a world, the evolutionary advantages of consciousness
may be stunning, for if we cannot, in principle, calculate the behavior of a uni-
verse, biosphere, animal and human life that is partially lawless yet wonderfully
non-random then there may be a profound advantage to conscious experience.
It is one way we can understand a partially lawless, non-random, hence non-
calculable, universe, biosphere, and free willed human life, and flourish in it.
I note at the outset that I think the scientific grounds for a quantum mind
are presently weak, that it is, at present, an improbable scientific hypothesis,
but that it is definitely not ruled out, as we shall see, (4 ).
This article is organized in the following sections. Section 1 discusses du-
alism and its standard philosophy of mind problems. Section 2 discusses some
facts about quantum mechanics needed for my discussion. Section 3 proposes
answers to how the mind acts on the brain and mind, that appear to be solved
by assuming the mind-brain system is quantum coherent, reversibly decoher-
ing to classicity for all practical purposes, FAPP, and returning to a quan-
tum state. Section 4, I take a first inadequate step towards a free will, it is
free but not responsible. Section 5, sketches a physical theory for a quantum
decohereing-recohering mind-brain system rather analogous to other theories
which, however, do not consider reversible decoherence and recoherence. Sec-
tion 6 is about possible steps towards a responsible free will. Section 7, I consider
several reasons why both reductionism and the Turing-Church-Deutsch princi-
ple is inadequate, that open the conceptual door toward partial lawlessness, yet
non-random becoming. Other scientists seem to be exploring similar ideas, as
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I describe, (14,15). I will in Section 8 use lawlessness yet non-randomness as
a hoped for avenue to a responsible free will. In section 9, I discuss why the
failure of Turing-Church-Deutsch gives a powerful selective advantage to con-
sciousness. If we and the universe are not TCD, then we cannot compute what
will happen. Consciousness seems a sufficient evolutionary solution and is thus
selectively advantageous. In Section 10, I confess that none of the above helps
understand the hard problem of qualia in themselves.
I hope the ideas in the article open new philosophic and scientific ground for
our considerations.
1 Dualism and Its Familiar Problems
Descartes famously supposed mind stuff and material stuff, res cogitans and
res extensia. Res extensia was conceived by Descartes as a machine, driven
by Aristotle’s efficient causes. We have held to the efficient cause view of the
material world from Descartes to Newton to the present. As noted it is the
logical basis of reductionism and TCD. With Descartes, res cogitans, experience,
hovered somehow in our brain/body and somehow nowhere. The immediate
issue that arose for Descartes and all who have followed was: How does mind
act on matter?
The standard form of this problem depends upon causal closure in the ma-
terial world of efficient causes. Any event (classical physical event) must have a
sufficient classical physical efficient cause. Thus there can be no first cause, and
causal closure is required. Given this view, and the current Mind-Brain Identity
theory, the standard concern is that brain events are sufficient causes of later
brain events, and there is nothing left over for mind to do to affect the brain.
Worse, there is no obvious way the mind, res cogitans on dualism, ’mind’ in a
mind-brain identity theory, could manage to act on brain.
You may respond: But on the mind-brain identity theory it is not legitimate
to then separate ’mind’ from ’brain’ and ask how the former acts on the latter.
They are identical by hypothesis. Yes, we can say the words, but we all expe-
rience qualia, inter alia with respect to other minds. How can our experiences
act on matter on any view at all, including the Mind-Brain identity theory? As
philosopher Michael Silberstein told me: (16), ”But it will be said of the mind-
brain identity theory: separate the mind aspect from the brain aspect. Now
how does the mind act on the brain?” Then Silberstein repeated the arguments
above about causal closure in brain stuff and nothing for mind to do, nor any
way for mind to do it to brain and body.
The response to this apparent impass is a retreat to epiphenomenalism: Mind
does nothing, in fact, it does not act on brain, it is an epiphenomena of brain.
It is fair to say that no one likes this view.
The third problem, assuming classical matter for the brain and causal clo-
sure, is free will. How can we have free will if the world’s becoming, like Newton’s
laws, are fully deterministic? Then we cannot have free will in truth. And since
all our behaviors are determined, we cannot have morally responsible free will.
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One response to this problem now prevalent is an appeal to deterministic
chaos in the brain and the thought that only a tiny subset of neurons underpin
conscious experience, (5,6). Then infinitesimal alterations in initial conditions
will lie on divergent trajectories with positive Lyapunov exponents, the butterfly
will flap energetically, and we will have the illusion of free will. This view may
well be true. But I want to argue that we do not need it.
2 Some Quantum Facts
We are all familiar with the basics of quantum mechanics, including the fa-
miliar Copenhagen interpretation and Born rule under which the time depen-
dent Schrodinger equation propagates a wave of ’possibilities’ whose amplitudes,
when squared, yield the probabilities of a given quantum degree of freedom being
measured in a classical apparatus setting. This view of quantum mechanics is,
as we all know, fully acausal. There is no cause for the radioactive decay event
that kill’s Schrodinger’s cat, just bad luck for the cat. Beyond Copenhagen,
we all know the Bohm and Many World interpretations of quantum mechanics,
which few hold in favor. I will base my discussion on Copenhagen/Born and
more recent work.
The central topic of my concern will be ’decoherence’ as an account of the
emergence of the classical world, or, for purists, the classical world FAPP, for
all practical purposes, from the quantum world, (17). This has been well estab-
lished in work by Leggett with a quantum system interacting with a quantum
oscillator bath, (18). More, decoherence is a well established experimental fact
in quantum computing, where it destroys the quantum coherence needed for
such computation, (19).
To be more precise, quantum interference, for example in the two slit exper-
iment, requires that all the phase information in the Schrodinger wave, or the
sum over all possible histories in Feynman’s formulation, arrive at the detec-
tor and interact by constructive or destructive interference. These interactions
yield the famous interference effects of quantum mechanics that defy classical
explanation.
Decoherence requires considering a quantum or quantum + classical ’sys-
tem’ and its quantum or quantum + classical environment. The central idea
is that quantum phase information is lost from the system to the environment,
so the system loses the capacity to exhibit quantum characteristic interference
phenomena. The system can approach classicity FAPP, or for some physicists,
a classical mixed state of classical probabilities not quantum probabilities that
superimpose.
It is essential to the discussion below that quantum decoherence, the loss of
phase information, is not a causal process in any sense. Rather phase infor-
mation, the heart of quantum possibility waves on Copenhagen and Born, is
lost acausally from the system to the environment and typically cannot, in any
practical way, be recovered.
The central implication of this is that decoherence constitutes the passage
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from the quantum world of possibilities to the actual classical (FAPP) world of
physical events, and there is nothing causal in this passage.
Below I will explain possible physical embodiments of my hypothesis that
the mind is quantum coherent, but reversibly locally passing to decoherence and
recoherence repeatedly. At this point I will say, however, that such reversible
passage from a coherent ’entangled state’ to decoherent-classical (FAPP) and
back is assured by Shor’s theorem that shows for a quantum computer whose
quantum degrees of freedom are decohering, that they can be made to recohere
to coherence by the injection of information in the now thermodynamically open
system, (21). More, Briegel has published two recent papers showing just such
reversible passage from quantum entangled to classical and back repeatedly,
(22,23).
Reversibility of the coherent to decoherent-classical to recoherent quantum
states are essential to my hypothesis for I wish the brain to be undergoing such
reversible transformations all the time. If we imagine the coherent spatially
extended regions of the brain, as discussed below, to be pink, and the decoherent
regions to be increasingly grey as decoherence sets in, I imagine a 3 dimensional
volume in the brain where each pixel- volume waxes and wanes pink to grey to
pink somewhat like an fMRI temporal image.
3 How Does the Mind ’Act On’ the Brain?
This question, which seems deeply difficult to answer for a classical brain,
becomes easy to answer in the current framework: The quantum coherent-
decohering-recohering mind does not act on the brain causally at all. Rather, by
decohering to classical (FAPP) states, the quantum coherent mind has acausal
consequences for the classical ”meat” of the brain. No causality from res cogi-
tans to res extensa is needed. Mind acausally has consequences for the classical
states of the brain.
We may or may not hold a quantum theory of the mind-brain system to be
scientifically plausible at this stage. Nevertheless, I claim that decoherence to
classicity FAPP is a substantial candidate to answer our 350 year old question
of how the mind ’acts on the brain’. It does not act on the brain causally. It
decoheres and this alters the classical state(s) of the brain.
Many, notably Dennett, (2), in Freedom Evolving, would disagree strongly
with the need for such a quantum decoherent account. Whatever the merits
of Dennett’s views, however, they do not vitiate the possibility that a quan-
tum decohering-recohering mind-brain may answer the question of how mind -
acausally - has consequences for physical matter.
Next, how does the either purely quantum mind, or quantum coherent-
decohering-recohering mind-brain system act on mind? A first order answer
is Schrodinger’s equation itself. Mind propagates quantum coherent time de-
pendent Schrodinger waves unitarily. As we will see this is actually not sufficient
for a responsible free will, but it is a start, allowing mind to have acausal con-
sequences for the temporal behavior of mind.
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With this, we are freed from a retreat into the mind as purely epiphe-
nomenon. Because we do not have to answer the familiar (classical physics)
question of how mind acts efficient causally on brain, the issue of epiphenome-
nalism does not arise.
4 A Random Free Will
We have now a beginning, but inadequate answer to free will. If we take mind to
be quantum coherent, then to decohere to classicity, and take this decoherence
to be identical to the standard interpretation of Copenhagen and Born, where
the ’collapse of the wave function’ occurs upon classical measurement, then
the Schrodinger equation gives the fully acausal fully random probability of a
quantum degree of freedom being measured with a specific value. In the older
Copenhagen interpretation, the wave function collapses from all its possible
values to a unique classically measured value.
Then since this process is acausal, we do not confront in the quantum realm
the issue of classical causal closure, so can have a ’free will’. This is a start, but
not adequate.
The inadequacy of this start of a theory of free will is that this free will is
not responsible. Here is the issue: If the mind causally and deterministically
determines the brain and our actions, then we do not have free will. Conversely,
if the determination of our actions by an acausal quantum mind is simply ran-
domly probabilistic, then again, we are not responsible for our actions. We just
randomly happen to kill the old man in the wheelchair.
This is a very deep problem. Attempting to address it will require most of
the rest of this article.
5 A Physical Theory of the QuantumMind-Brain
I begin with old and new opinions and facts. Had one asked a physicist twenty or
even ten years ago if the human brain could exhibit quantum coherent phenom-
ena, the response, after laughter, would have been that thermalization would
have destroyed any vestige of quantum coherence, so the answer was ’No’.
It is therefore astonishing and important that recent results on the chloro-
phyll molecule, surrounded by its evolved ’antenna protein’, has been shown
be quantum coherent for almost a nanosecond. Now the normal time scale for
decoherence is on the order of 10 to the -15 second, or a femto-second. Yet
these experiments, carried out at 77K, but thought to apply to chlorophyll in
plants at ambient temperature, show quantum coherence of an absorbed photon
traveling to the reaction center for over 700 femtoseconds, the length of their
longest trial, (24). No one expected this. The authors believe that the quantum
coherence increases dramatically the quantum efficiency of the energy gathering
process in photo-synthesis. More, they believe that the evolved antenna protein
either suppresses decoherence or induces recoherence. No one knows at present.
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It seems safe to conclude that quantum coherence for on the order of a billionth
of a second, a nanosecond, is possible and observerable at body or ambient tem-
perature. The evolved role of the antenna protein is testable by mutating its
sequence.
The time scale of neural activities is a million times slower, in the millisecond
range. But it takes light on the order of a millisecond to cross the brain, so if
there were a dispersed quantum decohering-recohering mind-brain, reaching the
millisecond range is probably within grasp of a quantum theory of the mind-
brain system.
The second recent fact, now widely studied by quantum chemists working on
proteins, is that quantum coherent electron transfer within and between proteins
is possible and almost certainly real. Because two proteins may coordinate
two water molecules, and the electron can pass between the proteins by two
pathways, in analogy with the two slit experiment, quantum interference can
happen, (25).
The next fact is that calculations of electrical conductivity between neigh-
boring proteins as a function of the distance between them shows a plateau
between 9 and 14 micron separation. The author, David Beratan (26), believes
that this plateau reflects quantum coherent electron transfer at this separation,
about right to coordinate a few water molecules between the proteins. More,
quantum coherent electron transfer occurs within proteins.
Now electrons are only one kind of quantum degree of freedom that may
transport within and between nearby complex molecules.
The next fact of importance is that the cell is densely crowded with macro-
molecules. I do not know the distribution of distances between them, but it
is on the order of dozens of angstroms, probably just enough to admit and co-
ordinate the locations of one or more water molecule that then can support
quantum coherent electron transport. This is open to investigation experimen-
tally, including the effects of alteration of osmotic effects, swelling or shrinking
cells by uptake or removal of water from the cells, on electron transport in cells.
Such shrinkage or swelling could surpass the 9-14 angstrom separation needed
for quantum coherent electron transport, hence be visible experimentally.
These facts raise the theoretical possibility that a percolating connected web
of quantum coherent-decohering-recohering processes could form among and be-
tween the rich web of packed molecules in a cell, let alone its membrane surfaces.
Hammeroff and Penrose (27) have suggested microtubules forming the cytoskele-
ton of cells as loci of coherent quantum behavior. Penrose, (8), has suggested
that quantum gravity may play a role in the transition to classicity. Others
have suggested a variety of molecular bases for extended molecular structures
that might support quantum coherent behavior, (28, 29). As far as I know, I
am the only investigator proposing a quantum coherent-decohering-recohering
model of the mind brain system, (4).
In short, we can imagine a physical substrate in cells that could carry a
quantum recohereing-decohering, pink and grey, process in cells and between
cells.
My own view of the above is that it remains scientifically unlikely, but given
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the chlorophyll results and quantum chemistry calculations on electron trans-
port, not impossible at all.
6 Possible Steps Towards a Responsible FreeWill
I begin with the comment that Aristotle considered four causes, formal, final,
material and efficient. In a simple example of a house, the formal cause of the
house is the design of the house, the blueprint. The material causes are the
bricks and mortar and beams. The final cause is my responsible free willed
decision to build the house. The efficient cause is the actual process of building
the house.
Aristotle also offered an account of scientific explanation: The syllogism. All
men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore Socrates is a mortal. Feel the
logical force of the conclusion. It underpins our sense that natural law governs
the universe rather than compactly describing its regularities.
As noted, Rosen (11) points out that with Newton’s laws, initial and bound-
ary conditions and differential equations, Aristotle’s maxim for scientific expla-
nation as a deduction snaps into place, for integration of Newton’s differential
equations constitutes precisely deduction. More, as Rosen rightly points out,
deduction and integration of differential equations becomes the complete math-
emization of efficient cause. All other Aristotelian causes were banished from
science. This banishment, this view that all that happens in the universe is to
be explained by deduction, lies at the base of our long love of reductionism,
Weinberg’s dream of a final theory, (10), and current string theory, (12). If
all explanation is by logical entailment, then we reason that there must be a
final theory of everything at the base of physics that entails logically all that
unfolds in the universe. The Turing-Church-Deutsch is in full harmony with
this: It is algorithms computing functions, or deducing from laws, all the way
down. As Descartes hoped, we live in a machine universe and are, res extensa,
living machines. No need for conscious experience, then, just take in data and
compute your world and response to it, like a robot seeking an electric plug to
get its battery recharged.
But there are clouds on the reductionist horizon. Physicist Stephen Hawking
recently published an article, ”Godel and the End of Physics”, (30), arguing
that it may be the case that no finite set of efficient cause laws will describe
the becoming of the universe, including mind. There may be no finite Theory
of Everything.
When a looming crisis such as this arises, it may be wise to question our
fundamental assumptions. One of these is our sole reliance in physics on efficient
cause laws.
I therefore now want to raise four issues that will take some time. First,
should we trust the 350 or 2500 year old belief that all that unfolds in the uni-
verse is due to efficient causes? Thereafter I will raise a second issue: Does
the becoming of the biosphere by Darwinian preadaptations admit of a suffi-
cient efficient law description? Third, does the quantum-classical world evolve
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according to a law? If not, does an abiotic natural selection and blind final
cause play a role in physics given a reversible quantum-classical process? Is this
process lawless and random, or lawless and non-random? Fourth, in considering
whether the quantum-classical world co-evolves according to law, is there reason
outside of a reversible quantum-classical process to doubt that the total process
is lawful, yet if not must it be random or can it be non-random? Later I will try
to find an opening for a responsible free will in a possible efficient cause lawless
yet non-random evolution of the quantum-classical world. If true, we will find
the possibility of free will but the non-probabilistic character needed, I hope,
for a responsible free will.
7 Reductionism and the Turing-Church-Deutsch
principle are Inadequate
7.1 Blind Final Causes
First I need to discuss the concept of a Darwinian adaptation. Philosopher
David Depew recently remarked that an adaptation, once achieved, is a ”blind
teleology”, (31). This is meant in just the same sense as Dawkin’s ”The Blind
Watchmaker”, (32). Darwin gave us a startling idea: the appearance of design
could arise without a designer. Thus, Depew envisons no designer, hence ”blind
teleology”.
Now I ask, can we speak of the opportunity for an adaptation before it oc-
curs? Consider an organism that is not light sensitive, and an offspring with a
red cell that is light sensitive and that constitutes an adaptation. I translate ’A
is an opportunity for an adaptation’ as ’A is possible. A may or may not occur.
If A occurs, it will tend to be selected and go to fixation in the population.’
Note that ’tend to go to fixation’ is a dispositional term, and is not open to
reduction by translation into any set of necessary and sufficient actual physical
events. Thus, the achievement of the adaptation in which the red celled organ-
ism is selected to fixation arises by a sequence of perfectly good actual efficient
causes. But because we cannot prestate necessary and sufficient efficient causes
that achieve an adaptation, we cannot have an efficient cause law for how the
adaptation will, in fact, be achieved. Thus, the opportunity for the adaptation
itself, is not an efficient cause. It is, instead, a blind final cause.
This is an essential conclusion. I give two examples, one economic, one bi-
ological. In the 1980s, in North America, there were lots of television stations,
programming, television sets and, of course, couch potatoes. In this economic
’niche’, could one hope reasonably to make money inventing the television re-
mote channel changer? Of course. And money was made on the invention. Now
were the television stations, programming, television sets and couch potatoes
efficient causes of the invention of the TV remote? No. These conditions are
what I will call ’enabling constraints’ or enabling conditions, constituting an
economic niche into which the TV remote ’fit’ and flourished. This is a case,
assuming responsible free will (our central issue of course) of Aristotle’s final
10
cause, and requires consciousness.
But the same issue arises in the evolution of the biosphere. Species form
niches into which other species ’fit’. New species evolve and create new niches
into which yet more new species evolve and fit. For example rabbits ’make a
living’ in a ’rabbit niche’, even if that niche is hard to define precisely. (So too
is the TV remote economic niche hard to define precisely.)
Do we think that the rabbit niche is an efficient cause of the evolution of
rabbits? No! The rabbit niche is an enabling constraint, or enabling condition,
that enabled rabbits to evolve, be selected and flourish. Here there is no thought
of conscious decision as above with the TV remote. Rather, we confront Depew’s
Blind Teleology and what I want to call ’Blind Final Cause’. This conclusion
is essential, for the rabbit niche did not cause the rabbit by efficient causes -
the efficient causes were the actual events that tended, the dispositional term
again, to lead to the selection of rabbits that made a living in the rabbit niche.
But this conclusion means that our reliance on efficient causes as the sole
explanation for the unfolding of the universe, or at least the biosphere that is
part of the universe, is wrong. Darwin told us so. The selective conditions con-
stitute the enabling conditions which are the Blind Watchmaker. But in turn,
this frees us from the ancient conviction in Western thought that explanation
in science can only be in terms of efficient causes - mathematized as deduction,
hence reductionism.
One has only to talk to a paleontologist, or better, an historian, to realize
that neither seeks to understand the facts of the world, what happened, in terms
of laws and deduction. Realizing the fundamental role of blind final cause in
the biosphere, let alone full teleological final cause, assuming responsible free
will, means that there is no Theory of Everything ’down there’, nor is all that
unfolds in the universe the deductive consequence of such a Final Weinbergian
Theory. It will take a long time, assuming the above is correct, to understand
its full implications.
7.2 Darwinian Preadaptations Cannot be Described by
Sufficient Efficient Cause Law, (4, 13)
Were we to ask Darwin the function of the human heart, he would say it is to
pump blood. But we might object that the heart makes heart sounds and moves
water in the pericardial sac. Darwin would say that these are not the function
of the heart, pumping blood is, because the heart was selected, so exists as a
complex organized structure and functional system in the universe, in order to
pump blood. It was of selective advantage. This is the familiar Darwinian Blind
Watchmaker adaptation.
But Darwin also noted that a causal property of an organism of no selective
use in the current environment might be of use in a new selective environment,
hence be selected. Typically a new function will come to exist. These are called
’exaptations’ or Darwinian preadaptations. There is no thought of evolutionary
foresight here.
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I give two biological examples. Swim bladders are in some fish. The level of
air and water in the sac adjusts neutral buoyancy in the water column. Pale-
ontologists believe that swim bladders arose from the lungs of lung fish. Water
got into some lungs, now there was a sac with air and water, poised to evolve
into a swim bladder. Assume the paleontologists are correct.
Two initial question arise: Did a new function come to exist in the biosphere?
Yes, neutral buoyancy in the water column. Did this affect the future evolution
of the biosphere? Of course, new species, proteins, niches.
The second example concerns the three middle ear bones of mammals. These
evolved from three adjacent jaw bones of an early teleost fish by preadaptations.
This example is important because relational degrees of freedom matter. Were
one bone in the skull, one in the spine, and one in the jaw, probably hearing
bones would not have evolved.
Now I ask the same two questions. Did a new function come to exist in the
biosphere? Yes, hearing. Did this alter the further evolution of the biosphere?
Yes, new species, proteins, niches.
Now I come to my critical third question: Do you think you could prestate all
possible Darwinian preadaptations for all organisms alive now? Well, we don’t
know all organisms alive now, so I simplify: Could you prestate all possible
preadaptations just for humans?
I’ve now asked thousands of people. We all agree the answer is ’No’. Parts
of the reasons we seem unable to accomplish this task are these: How would we
list all possible selective conditions? How would we know we had completed the
list? How would we prestate the one or many relational features of one or several
organisms that might become preadaptations? We all feel utterly stymied. We
have no way even to start on this task let alone complete it.
I now introduce the ’Adjacent Possible’. Consider 1000 chemical species in
a beaker, and call them the Actual. Let them react by a single reaction step.
If new species of molecules are formed, call these the Adjacent Possible of the
initial Actual. This is perfectly defined, given a minimum stable lifetime of a
species and standard reaction conditions.
I now point to the Adjacent Possible of the Biosphere. Once there were lung
fish, swim bladders were in the adjacent possible of the biosphere. Before there
were multicelled organisms, swim bladders were not in the adjacent possible of
the biosphere.
Now let us see what we have agreed to, unless you think you really can name
all human preadaptations. What we have agreed to is that we do not know all
the possibilities in the adjacent possible of the biosphere! Not only do we not
know what will happen, we do not even know what can happen.
The next point concerns probability statements about the evolution of the
biosphere by Darwinian preadaptations. Consider flipping a fair coin 10,000
times. It will come up heads about 5000 times with a binomial distribution.
But note that we knew ahead of time all the possible 2 to the 10,000th power
outcomes, all heads, all tails and so on. We knew all the possibilities, or the sam-
ple space, so could construct a frequency interpretation of probability measure
over the space.
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But we do not know the set of possible Darwinian preadaptations, the sample
space, so cannot construct a probability measure.
Laplace had a different version of probability. If confronted by N doors,
behind one of which was a treasure, with no further information, the chance that
we pick the right door, he said, is 1/N. But note that we know N, the number
of doors. We do not know N for the biosphere so cannot construct a probability
measure for the evolution of the biosphere by Darwinian preadaptations.
Worse, if a natural law is a compact description of the regularities of a
process, can we have a sufficient natural law for the emergence of swim bladders?
No. We cannot even state the possibility, let alone the probability, let alone have
a description of the regularities of a process. So the becoming of the biosphere
by Darwinian preadaptations is partially beyond natural law.
This is a major conclusion: We cannot have sufficient natural law for the
evolution of the biosphere by Darwinian preadaptations. Yet such preadapta-
tions are common in the biosphere, let alone the economy, cultural evolution
and history. But if this is true, then there can be no final Theory of Every-
thing from which all that unfolds in the universe is logically entailed. With
it, the Turing-Church-Deutsch thesis is very strongly weakened. No algorithm
will simulate the evolution of the biosphere with all the quantum events that
did or might have happened. Nor could we confirm which simulation was cor-
rect. And by the above argument, the becoming of the biosphere by Darwinian
preadaptations is not entailed by any Theory of Everything.
In its place is a vast creativity in which blind final cause, opportunities for
adaptation, and unstatable Darwinian preadaptations partially alter how the
biosphere evolves.
It is critical that we have here a process that is partially lawless, yet also
is not random! The swim bladder and TV remote succeeded in their contexts.
Again, the actual process is not describable by a sufficient natural law, but is
also not random. We do not have this concept in our physics or our philosophy.
It bears, I think, on a responsible free will. For we have here a partially lawless
but non-random becoming. We are no longer trapped by deterministic efficient
cause law, including deterministic chaos, versus ’merely random probabilistic’
views of mind and brain. The success of the swim bladder and TV remote
are not merely random probabilistic chance. We have, for the first time since
Descartes, new freedom of intellectual maneuver.
What does this process of biological evolution say to entailment from a theory
of everything? No. And what does it say to the TCD thesis? No.
7.3 Reversible Decohrence and Recoherence are Partially
Lawless and may be subject to Abiotic Natural Selec-
tion Blind Final Cause
I now discuss a controversial topic. I wish to build my case for a quantum
coherent-decohering-recohering responsible free will. I base the transition to
classicity on decohrence. Is it lawful? I argue no, based on a position advocated
13
by Karl Popper in his The Open Universe, (32). Popper uses his argument
to support indeterminacy, hence his Open Universe. I too argue for an Open
Universe elsewhere on Popper’s and some of the grounds given above and below,
(4,33).
Popper considers the setting of special relativity. An event A has a past
light cone and a future light cone, separated by a zone of possible simultaneity.
B is an event in the future light cone of A, so has its own past light cone that
includes all of A’s past light cone, but parts of B’s past light cone are space-
like separated from A’s past light cone. It follows that at event A, an observer
cannot know the parts of B’s past light cone outside of A’s light cone. Yet the
events in this zone outside of A’s past light cone and within B’s past light cone
can influence the event, B. But if an efficient cause law is to be constructable by
the observer, then that observer cannot do so prior to event B. For the situated
observer at event A , and before event B, no efficient cause law describes the
event B; such a law is unknowable and unconstructable by an observer at A and
before B.
I now translate this to the decoherence setting. Picture two classical (or
quantum) detectors retreating from one another at uniform velocity, the special
relativity setting. Now consider a complex organic molecule in a dense mix-
ture of such molecules. A pair of entangled particles is emitted by the organic
molecules, event A, and fly off, say at the speed of light. Some time later they
are detected, one or both, by the two detectors, event B. Then at the event
A, (and before the B event), of the leaving of the entangled particles from the
molecule in question, it is impossible to know what events outside the past light
cone of A, but inside the past light cone of B, the detection of one or both
entangled particles, may influence the B event. But that B event is instanta-
neously correlated by EPR and may affect the decohrence of molecule A. For
example the shape of the electron cloud and nuclei positions may be affected,
falling into one of two alternative decoherent potential wells. Thus, Popper’s
construction implies that there is no law in detail for decoherence. There is no
efficient cause law, or function, mapping from the space-time region including A
and stopping before B, but including the retreating detectors, that maps into the
future to B and after event B. But a law is supposed to be a compact description
of the regularities of a process available, like Newton’s laws, before, during and
after the events unfold. Then there can be no such law or function.
But what are the moving detectors? Special Relativity becomes important
at speeds near that of light, but is relevant at any speed of relative motion. Con-
sider our molecular soup in a cell, crowded with molecules and macromolecules
at body temperature, jiggling and folding and unfolding, moving relative to one
another as quantum coherent electrons may pass between them. The relative
motions are not constant, but Special Relativity still applies. Each event has
a past and future light cone and a zone, small, but finite, because relative mo-
tions are small, zone of possible simultaneity. No efficient cause function, or
law, I claim, describes detailed decoherence in cells. No law or function maps
the time space region including A and before B occurs, into what happens at B.
If there is a lack of law, an absence of a function, F, that maps from A and its
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space-time region including the moving detectors, but before B, into a future
which includes B, then it appears there can be no theory of everything which
entails by deduction beforehand all that happens in the universe, and the TCD
thesis is again weakened, and perhaps inadmissible in detail.
Obviously, this is a new line of thought. The critical implication that I
hope is true is that a quantum decohering-recohering mind-brain identity will
propagate trillions of these slightly lawless events. Then, the lawlessness but
non-randomness can avalanche so that the longer term behavior of the brain is
both lawless yet non-random, and can serve as a basis for a responsible free will,
neither deterministic nor ’just random chance’. I return to this below.
No Law Describes the Details of Decoherence and Recoherence. Both Shor’s
theorem and Briegel’s work imply that recoherence is possible. It may or may
not be describable by a law. But if the quantum-classical world is reversible, and
decohrence itself is without detailed law available before hand and constructible
at A, then the total process cannot be lawful. So the total becoming of the
quantum-classical world is beyond sufficient natural law. This seems to imply
that no Theory of Everything will describe this becoming, and, as D. d’Lambert,
(34), pointed out to me, this seems to imply that the quantum measurement
problem is insoluble. With respect to the quantum mind/brain, this means that
there is no efficient cause law for its detailed time evolution.
Possible Abiotic Natural Selection and Blind Final Cause at the Quantum-
Classical Interface. If quantum to classical is reversible, and if some composi-
tions of classical matter, in their quantum-classical environmental context, are
more resistant to returning to the quantum world of mere possibilities, then they
will be subjected to an abiotic natural selection in that selective environment,
or niche. Thus an abiotic natural selection may apply at the quantum-classical
interface in appropriate circumstances where the environment has a strong bear-
ing on the decoherence process. It seems plausible that this is true in cells. If
this is correct, the abiotic natural selection, like the Blind Watchmaker, creates
environments that are opportunities, blind final causes, for the persistence of
any bit of now classical, FAPP, matter. As that bit of matter evolves by adding
or subtracting constituents, fitter variants would be expected to be found. Like
blind final cause in the biosphere, we cannot prestate all the necessary and
sufficient conditions of efficient causes th at achieves such adaptations.
7.4 Quantum Decoherence and the Subsequent Behavior
of the Quantum-Classical System are Lawless but not
Random
In standard quantum mechanics of, say an electron in a classical box, the physi-
cist uses the classical box as classical boundary conditions and solves for the
probability distribution of properties of the electron in the box. These boundary
conditions enter the Hamiltonian of the total system.
Now I raise a new question: Suppose part of a complex quantum system,
say the molecular soup in a cell, decoheres to classicity FAPP and yet this deco-
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herence is somewhat lawless by Popper’s arguments above. Then if we can ever
say of the now classical part of the system that it alters the Hamiltonian of the
remaining quantum system, a vexed question, we do not know in detail how the
Hamiltonian changes because we do not know in detail how the quantum system
decohered, partially lawlessly. In short, a coherent quantum state propagates
unitarily, preserving probability. But the decoherence process is dissipative -
phase information is lost, but by Popper above, somewhat lawlessly. How can
we know the detailed classical FAPP state, positions of nuclei, for example, that
arise? We cannot, so cannot recompute the further behavior of the total system.
It is somewhat lawless, (20).
Another way of saying this is that, with decoherence, the system falls to a
’mixed’ state where all the probabilities are now classical and drawn from some
distribution, say of where the nuclei in the molecule are. But my claim is that
we cannot know that mixed state probability distribution, for we do not know
how decoherence happened. For all we know, the now classical probability
distribution of the mixed state could be anything, including sharply peaked
over a few alternatives. Again, the becoming of this system has no efficient
cause function or law for its temporal evolution. Again this casts doubt on the
capacity of a Theory of Everything to deduce by entailment all that unfolds
in the universe. And it casts doubt on the Turing-Church-Deutsch principle of
algorithms all the way down.
Remarkably, Conway and Kochen, in the Free Will Theorem, (14), and the
(Strong) Free Will Theorem, (15), on entirely different arguments, reach much
the same conclusions. ”Some believe that the alternative to determinism is
randomness, and go on the say that ’allowing randomness into the world does
not really help understand free will” ... ”adding randomness also does not ex-
plain the quantum mechanical effects described by our theorem. It is precisely
the semi-free (my emphasis) nature of twinned particles, and more generally of
entanglement, that shows that something very different from classical stochas-
ticism is at play here. Although the Free Will Theorem suggests to us that
determinism is not a viable option, it nevertheless enables us to agree with Ein-
stein that ’God does not play dice with the Universe’. In the present state of
knowledge, it is certainly beyond our capabilities to understand the connection
between the free decisions of particles and humans, but the free will of neither
of these is accounted for by mere randomness (my emphasis) ... The import of
the Free Will Theorem is that it is not only current quantum theory, but the
world itself that is non-deterministic, so that no future theory can return us to
a clockwork universe”. Elsewhere, (14), ”Physical theories since Descartes have
described the evolution of a state from an initial arbitrary or ’free state’ accord-
ing to laws that are themselves independent of space and time. We call such
theories ... Free State Theories”. But ”No free state theory can exactly predict
the results of twinned spin one experiments (my emphasis) ... (In short, no
function, F, maps the current state of the system into its future. My comment
and emphasis.).”We shall see that it follows from the Free State theorem that
no free state theory that gives a mechanism for reduction, and a fortiori, no
hidden variable theory (such as Bohm’s) can be made relativistically invariant”.
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Thus, Conway and Kochen find grounds for lawlessness - no function maps the
present to the future give n a ’free state’, and a non-random ’semi-free’ nature
of twinned particles. (My comment and emphasis). This too casts doubt on a
Theory of Everything explaining all that unfolds by deductive entailment and
doubt on the Turing-Church-Deutsch principle.
8 Responsible Free Will
The familiar problem of a responsible free will, to state it again is this: If mind
or even mind acting on brain, is deterministic, then we have no free will, but
perhaps the illusion we do, for example via chaotic dynamics. Also a classical
mind/brain, I note, leaves us with the forever unsolved problem of how mind acts
on matter. A quantum decohering recohereing mind does have consequences for
matter, so affords a solution to this 350 year old problem.
Conversely in standard quantum mechanics, on Copenhagen and Born rule,
and quantum degrees of freedom, there is only the Schrodinger equation pos-
sibility wave, amplitudes squared, and an acausal fully probabilistic or random
chance occurrence of an event, say the radioactive decay that kills Schrodinger’s
cat, as given by that equation. We obtain a free will but only a random chance
free will. Again there can be no notion of a responsible free will. Obviously this
is insufficient.
The discussion above has opened new conceptual avenues. In brief review
Blind Final cause, acting as enabling constraints or enabling conditions, can
play a non efficient causal role in the evolution of the biosphere, and, if I am
right, at the quantum classical reversible boundary with abiotic natural selec-
tion. In short, blind final cause frees us from full reliance on efficient cause
and explanation by deduction, yet what happens is both partially lawless, yet
non-random. This is surely true for the evolution of the biosphere. There seems
no reason not to consider this lawless but non-random evolution of the quantum
classical boundary in a system as complex as the brain. In short, in the case of
blind final cause, biological adaptations in general, and economic-technological
development, and history, it seems that the process is both partially beyond
sufficient efficient cause natural law, yet, importantly, very much context de-
pendent and non-random. Both the swim bladder and the TV remote were
successfully ’selected’ in their environment. We may hope that the same applies
to possible abiotic natural selection at the quantum-classical boundary.
But we have an entire second line of consideration, without invoking abiotic
natural selection. As just pointed out, the evolution of a quantum-classical
reversible system can have no law for its becoming because we do not know
how the mixed state of classical probabilities forms its distribution by lawless
decoherence to classicity FAPP. Alternatively, we do not know, after such lawless
decoherence, how the Hamiltonian of the entire system changes. (I note that
some physicists do not like this step at all, so caution is required.
I comment that there are experimental tests open to test for such lawless-
ness in two slit-like experiments as the complexity of the entities passed in
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beams through the slit increase. Anton Zeilinger (35) has shown that Buck-
meisterfullerenes interfere. Presumably a stream of rabbits would not. At the
complexity of objects where decoherence sets is, it should be possible to test if
that decoherence is fully lawful or yields unstable statistics, perhaps as inter-
ference bands start to fade. In so far as the lawlessness depends upon Special
Relativity as in Popper’s argument, the speed of relative retreating motion of
classical detectors should be positively correlated with signatures of lawlessness.
More, if lawless decoherence depends upon the complexity of the quantum
or quantum plus classical environment, then it is reasonable to assume that
decoherence by loss of phase information would occur more readily in a ’dense’
and complex quantum environment. If so, then at that complexity of objects
where decoherence sets in, a dense ’beam’ of objects would be expected to show
more decohrence and less lawfulness, than a rarified beam. Conceivably evidence
for abiotic selection at the quantum-classical boundary could be found.
What we seek, based on a quantum coherent-decohering-recohering theory
of mind and brain, is a use of these ideas to escape the familiar philosophic
boxes. We now have two routes to lawlessness but non-random behavior at
the quantum-classical boundary we can consider, either of which may provide
the pathway to a responsible free will, rather than a merely ’random’ free will:
abiotic natural selection and no way to propagate the unknown mixed state
distribution.
What we need is a way for what we can interpret as ’intentions’ to shape the
decoherence-recoherence process such that the classical happenings are altered
as are the quantum aspects of the total system. One natural role for intentions
to play is as enabling constraints shaping the classical matter. One route is by
influencing abiotic natural selection through alterations in the quantum envi-
ronment that selects for resistance to return to the quantum world. In short,
in the context of abiotic natural selection of classical degrees of freedom resis-
tant to return to quantum, the natural assumption is that the ’environment’ of
the system is itself a complex mixture of dense quantum and classical events
which thereby shapes how decoherence to classicity for all practical purposes of
a ’system’ in that environment occurs, hence what occurs in the actual phys-
ical world. Then this environment shapes the abiotic natural selection which
then alters further non-lawful but non-random decoherence and abiotic natural
selection.
An alternative pathway rests on lack of lawfulness about the mixed state
classical probability distribution. This can be lawless, because due to lawless
decoherence, yet may yield a classical probability distribution with very use-
ful properties for an intending mind. Thus, the probability distribution could
become peaked over one or a few alternatives. Mind would have shaped the
becoming of the mind-brain quantum decohering-recohering system is a lawless
yet non-random way.
On either of the above accounts above, we seem to have a possibility of a
responsible free will. This account is obviously only schematic at this stage of
development.
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9 Why Might Consciousness Be Selectively
Advantageous?
This is a very hard problem. For most examples, an unconscious computerized
robot would seem to do as well. Humphries argues that humans are conscious
because awareness ’enchants us’ so makes us fitter, (36). It is an enchanting
idea and may be right.
The fundamental argument that consciousness is not useful, however, rests
on both reductionism and the Turing-Church-Deutsch principle. According to
that principle, we live in a Cartesian machine universe, fully simulable to ar-
bitrary accuracy on a universal Turing machine, and we too are Cartesian ma-
chines. Our sensors can pick up the environment and compute what they will,
hopefully having been selected to be a useful set of sensors. But there is no
advantage of being aware, of consciousness, of qualia.
What if TCD is, as I have argued, false? What if reductionism itself is false,
as I have argued. Then the universe is not a deductively entailed unfolding in
its becoming, and no universal Turing machine in me can capture or simulate
all of that, partially efficient cause lawless but non-random becoming.
But if this is true, if the universe and we are not TCD, if reductionism is
false, and all that happens is not entailed by a final theory down there which is
’simulable’ to arbitrary accuracy, then there may be an enormous advantage to
consciousness. If I am a responsible free willed tiger chasing a responsible free
willed gazelle, I can ’see’ what the gazelle is choosing freely to do and alter my
behavior. But I cannot compute what the free willed gazelle will do.
In short, it seems to me that the putative non-TCD, non-reductionist char-
acter of the real universe, other life, animals and us, renders consciousness
selectively advantageous. The degree to which consciousness is selectively ad-
vantageous depends upon how far we are from TCD and reductionism in the
real universe and our lives. No one knows, of course, but this seems a fresh start
to the problem of why consciousness evolved.
10 The Hard Problem, Qualia
Does any of the above help? I do not think so, at least yet... It may be that
it points to an avenue that might conceivably help someday, but as ever, we
have no idea what consciousness ’is’. I cannot avoid one thought: reductionism
is inherently third person, for deduction is mere logical entailment, verifiable
by all of us in third person language. And we feel profoundly that ’objective
knowledge’ must be third person sharable. Is there some kind of clue here?
All our knowledge of the world is inherently first person. Something big seems
missing. As Strawson noted long ago, (37), we can only be in the world as here-
now oriented subjects, not objects. How trapped are we by reductionism into a
third person ’knowing’ view of the world? More, being in the world when we do
not always know what can happen cannot be a matter only of reason or knowing.
Reason and knowing are then insufficient guides to living our lives. How are
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we, then, in the world? Perhaps if we try to give up third person language as
primary, objective, scientific, and focus on being in the world when we cannot
know, that may help with the hard problem.
Conclusions
I have presented the mind-brain identity theory in the context of two physical
theories: first one in which a multiparticle quantum-classical system is capa-
ble of decohering reversibly to classicity, or classicity for all practical purposes.
This allows mind to have consequences for brain without having to act by ef-
ficient cause on brain. This appears to resolve two outstanding problems in
the philosophy of mind that have plagued us since Descartes: how the mind
’acts on’ matter - it does so acausally via decoherence. How does mind act on
mind - via the quantum decohering-recohering dynamical behavior of the mind-
brain identity system. Second, I have discussed both reductionism and the
Turing-Church- Deutsch principle and find both inadequate. Part of this is the
inadequacy of a purely efficient cause view of the unfolding of the biosphere and
perhaps the quantum-classical boundary, where I suggested in a Special Rela-
tivity setting that detailed decoherence is lawless. No function maps the present
slice of space-time into its future. And I suggested an abiotic natural selection
and a complex quantum-classical environment that shapes the decoherence to
classicity FAPP, where that environment acts as the intention that non-lawfully
but non-randomly shapes the consequences of mind for brain and action. In
the apparent failure of reductionism and TCD, we have new grounds both for
a responsible free will and an evolutionary advantage in evolving consciousness.
We are not, on this view, machines, nor is the becoming of the universe a ma-
chine open to deductive inference. All this is quite radical and will need careful
scrutiny. But it seems possible to test for lawlessness at the quantum-classical
boundary, and if so, this article is both philosophy and genuine science.
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